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INTRODUCTION
Ahmet Yildiz was a twenty-six-year-old gay man living in Tur-
key. In 2008, he came out to his family and friends. Shortly thereaf-
ter, he began receiving death threats from his family, so he filed a
complaint with the prosecutor’s office.1 The office refused to inves-
† J.D. 2013, Hofstra University School of Law. Ms. Steinke focused her studies in
human rights law and represented asylum seekers through the Hofstra Law Asylum
Clinic. She would like to thank Professors Rose Cuison Villazor and Frank Gulino for
their thoughtful advice on this piece, Professor Lauris Wren for inspiring a passion
for asylum law, and Mark Franklin for his unwavering love and support.
1 Nicholas Birch, Was Ahmet Yildiz the Victim of Turkey’s First Gay Honour Killing?,
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tigate the complaint or provide any protection for Yildiz.2 Three
months after the complaint was filed, Yildiz was killed after being
shot five times upon leaving his apartment to go buy ice cream.3
Prosecutors believe that it was Yildiz’s father who traveled 600 miles
to find and murder his son.4 Soon after the murder, prosecutors
suspected that Yildiz’s father was on the run and possibly hiding in
northern Iraq.5  Yildiz’s father has still not been located, and has
been tried in absentia in a trial that continues “at a glacial pace.”6
An honor killing is a form of premeditated murder with a
unique motivation: to cleanse the dishonor that has been cast
upon the perpetrator’s family as a result of the actions (real or per-
ceived) of the victim.7 If Ahmet Yildiz had come to the United
States and filed for asylum, claiming that he feared becoming the
victim of an honor killing at the hands of one of his family mem-
bers in Turkey, would his claim have been recognized as legiti-
mate? Or would the court, relying on the fact that honor killings
are predominately directed towards women, find Yildiz’s claim
lacking in merit because he was male?
This Note examines the unique dimensions of honor killing
asylum claims and focuses on the claims brought by men who fear
becoming the victims of such violence. While honor killings cer-
tainly have an overwhelming gender element (as women are most
often the victims), men have also been victims of this form of vio-
lence.8 Much of the current legal scholarship dealing with the
threat of an honor killing as a basis for asylum has argued that
asylum law largely ignores the many forms of persecution and
threats of persecution that women face simply because they are wo-
men.9 However, men are not only killed by their family members
INDEPENDENT (July 19, 2008), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/
was-ahmet-yildiz-the-victim-of-turkeys-first-gay-honour-killing-871822.html.
2 Dan Bilefsky, Soul-Searching in Turkey After a Gay Man Is Killed, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
25, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/26/world/europe/26turkey.html?page
wanted=all.
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 Pelin Turgut, Turkish Taboos Challenged by Success of Gay ‘Honor Killing’ Movie,
TIME (Feb. 28, 2012), http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2107434,00.
html.
7 See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL USA, CULTURE OF DISCRIMINATION: A FACT SHEET
ON “HONOR” KILLINGS 1 (2012) [hereinafter CULTURE OF DISCRIMINATION], available at
http://www.amnestyusa.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/honor_killings_fact_sheet_final
_2012.doc.
8 See infra Part I.B.
9 See, e.g., Crystal Doyle, Isn’t “Persecution” Enough? Redefining the Refugee Definition
to Provide Greater Asylum Protection to Victims of Gender-Based Persecution, 15 WASH. & LEE
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for their homosexuality, but for marrying or dating women against
the wishes of the women’s families. This Note argues that the
courts should not view honor killings as a form of persecution that
targets women exclusively, but as a form of persecution that sub-
jects an individual to the ultimate act of violence solely because of a
sense of shame that that individual’s action (or unconfirmed, ru-
mored action) has brought upon another individual or family.
Part I provides a comprehensive background about honor kill-
ings, including their cultural significance, circumstances in which
men are the victims of honor killings, and how honor killings differ
from domestic violence.
Part II focuses on asylum claims that have been based on the
fear of becoming the victim of an honor killing. This Part analyzes
the unique difficulties posed by these claims and includes a survey
of all such cases that have been heard by the U.S. Courts of Ap-
peals. It also includes an overview of the honor killings claims that
have been brought by male applicants. This Part demonstrates that
thus far, not only have the rulings rendered by the circuit courts in
honor killing asylum cases been entirely inconsistent, but for male
applicants, the very definition of “honor killings” used by the court
can significantly influence the outcome of the case.
Finally, Part III argues that while there should indeed be a
heavier focus on recognizing the various forms of gender-based
persecution suffered by female asylum seekers, courts should not
limit the definition of “membership in a particular social group” to
women who are threatened by honor killings. By focusing exclu-
sively on women’s rights and construing “membership in a particu-
lar social group” so narrowly as to only include women, the courts
risk creating an untenable distinction between the male and fe-
J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 519 (2009) (arguing that the underlying purpose of asylum
would be better served through the elimination of the causal nexus requirement be-
tween the persecution and one of the “five grounds,” especially since women claiming
asylum predicated on gender-based persecution are disproportionately disadvantaged
by this requirement); Valeria Plant, Honor Killings and the Asylum Gender Gap, 15 J.
TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 109 (2005) (highlighting arguments that adding “gender” as a
protected ground for asylum would be almost entirely symbolic, but that recognizing
a state’s failure to protect a victim as a form of persecution and providing asylum
adjudicators with more gender-sensitivity training would significantly improve the
chances of women gaining asylum); Shira T. Shapiro, She Can Do No Wrong: Recent
Failures in America’s Immigration Court to Provide Women Asylum from “Honor Crimes”
Abroad, 18 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 293 (2010) (arguing not only that courts
hearing honor killing asylum claims should pay more attention to the meaning of
honor killings specifically within the context of the applicant’s country of origin, but
that the courts should also prohibit a female applicant’s delayed report of sexual
abuse from harming her credibility).
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male victims of this form of persecution. However, by defining
“honor killings” in a gender-neutral way, the courts would avoid
creating such an indefensible distinction while properly keeping
the focus of their inquiry on the reality of honor killings in the
applicant’s country of origin and the credibility of the threat faced
by the applicant. This effort can and should be supported by fed-
eral agencies, such as the Department of State and the U.S. Citizen-
ship and Immigration Services, whose own human rights
terminology helps influence these asylum decisions.
I. HONOR KILLINGS
Human Rights Watch calls honor killings “the most extreme
form of domestic violence, a crime based in male privilege and pre-
rogative and women’s subordinate social status.”10 Before examin-
ing how the courts analyze asylum claims based on the fear of
persecution in the form of an honor killing, it is important to un-
derstand the underlying purpose of such violence. After examining
honor killings in general, this section highlights that honor killings
are not directed exclusively at women, a fact that is essential to the
underlying validity of this type of asylum claim brought by a male
applicant. This section concludes by focusing on the crucial dis-
tinctions between honor killings and domestic violence, distinc-
tions that must not be ignored when analyzing an honor killing
asylum claim.
A. The Cultural Significance
The United Nations Population Fund estimates that world-
wide, 5,000 women and girls are the victims of honor killings each
year.11 Many honor killings go unreported, making it extremely dif-
ficult to acquire accurate statistics.12 It is especially difficult to ob-
tain accurate statistics since honor killings are often viewed as
private family affairs13 instead of crimes worthy of condemnation
by society at large. Additionally, since honor killings are motivated
by cleansing the dishonor and shame brought upon the family, co-
10 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, HONORING THE KILLERS: JUSTICE DENIED FOR ‘HONOR’
CRIMES IN JORDAN 1 (2004) [hereinafter HONORING THE KILLERS], available at http://
www.hrw.org/reports/2004/04/19/honoring-killers.
11 CULTURE OF DISCRIMINATION, supra note 7, at 1.
12 AUSTRIAN CTR. FOR COUNTRY OF ORIGIN & ASYLUM RESEARCH & DOCUMENTATION
(ACCORD), PAKISTAN: HONOUR KILLING OF MEN A-6813, at 2 (2009) [hereinafter AC-
CORD, PAKISTAN: HONOUR KILLING OF MEN], available at http://www.unhcr.org/ref
world/docid/4a5604292.html.
13 Shapiro, supra note 9, at 310.
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operating with researchers would only bring more attention to the
family’s tarnished reputation.14  A study conducted by the Aurat
Foundation exemplifies these principles; it found that of the 1,636
honor killings believed to have occurred in Pakistan between 2008
and 2011,15 less than two percent were registered with the local
police authorities.16
Honor killings are widely reported across the Middle East and
South Asia, although they occur all around the world.17 Those who
carry out and support such crimes share a deeply held belief in the
importance of maintaining family honor, which is viewed as a
shared responsibility.18 In cultures where women’s lives literally de-
pend on keeping their honor intact, men are expected to “fiercely
defend” the honor of themselves and their families, “so as not to be
reduced to women.”19 Furthermore, the murder of a woman for
any suspected transgression of social norms is a powerful way of
demonstrating control over the entire female population, as
“[o]ne only has to kill a few girls and women to keep the others in
line.”20
Unni Wikan, a social anthropologist and professor at the Uni-
versity of Oslo, defines an honor killing as “a murder carried out as
a commission from the extended family, to restore honor after the
family has been dishonored. As a rule, the basic cause is a rumor
that any female family member has behaved in an immoral way.”21
It takes only a rumor or insinuation to defile honor, as it is the
public perception of honor that matters.22 In Jordan, for example,
about ninety percent of honor killings are based on mere suspicion
or rumor of an illicit sexual relationship.23
14 Phyllis Chesler, Are Honor Killings Simply Domestic Violence?, 16 MIDDLE E. Q. 61
(2009), available at http://www.meforum.org/2067/are-honor-killings-simply-domes-
tic-violence.
15 See MALIHA ZIA LARI, A PILOT STUDY ON: ‘HONOUR KILLINGS’ IN PAKISTAN AND
COMPLIANCE OF LAW 38 (2011), available at http://www.af.org.pk/pub_files/1366345
831.pdf.
16 See id. at 42. The study used four Pakistani districts as the sample group. Id.
17 CULTURE OF DISCRIMINATION, supra note 7, at 1.
18 See id. at 2.
19 Rachel A. Ruane, Murder in the Name of Honor: Violence Against Women in Jordan
and Pakistan, 14 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 1523, 1532 (2000).
20 Phyllis Chesler, Worldwide Trends in Honor Killings, 17 MIDDLE E. Q. 3 (2010),
available at http://www.meforum.org/2646/worldwide-trends-in-honor-killings.
21 Chesler, Are Honor Killings Simply Domestic Violence?, supra note 14.
22 Ruane, supra note 19, at 1531–32 (arguing that because it is the public percep-
tion of honor that matters, it is irrelevant whether women accused of illicit conduct
are actually guilty of such, which is why most women are never given the opportunity
to defend themselves from these allegations).
23 Kathryn Christine Arnold, Comment, Are the Perpetrators of Honor Killings Getting
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Human Rights Watch describes honor killings as “the most
tragic consequence and graphic illustration of deeply embedded,
society-wide gender discrimination.”24 As would be expected in any
culture that encourages men to control women’s independence
and sexuality through violence, the sword rarely cuts both ways. Al
Sisiwar, an Arab Women’s group, recognizes that there exists “a
deeply-rooted double standard in Islamic culture that forbids pre-
marital sex by both genders but seldom punishes men who trans-
gress.”25 Yet, while more rare than female victims of honor killings,
men can find themselves the targets of those who feel that their
honor has been tarnished.
B. Male Victims of Honor Killings
In 2004, the number of female honor killing victims in Paki-
stan was more than twice the amount of male victims.26 But while
the vast majority of honor killing victims worldwide are women,
about seven percent are men.27 Most male victims are killed by the
family of the woman alleged to have been conducting an illicit rela-
tionship with the man.28 And while the murder of Ahmet Yildiz has
been categorized by some as Turkey’s first gay honor killing, a re-
searcher of honor crimes in Turkey has confirmed that other men
Away with Murder? Article 340 of the Jordanian Penal Code Analyzed Under the Convention of
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 16 AM. U. INT’L L. REV.
1343, 1369 (2001).
24 HONORING THE KILLERS, supra note 10, at 1.
25 Kenneth Lasson, Bloodstains on a “Code of Honor”: The Murderous Marginalization
of Women in the Islamic World, 30 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 407, 440 (2009). Lasson argues
that the lack of worldwide public awareness about the prevalence of honor killings, as
well as the hesitation by governments to prosecute those complicit in religiously moti-
vated violence against women, is contributing to the violent repression of women in
Islamic countries. Indeed, while Western cultures strongly condemn honor killings,
some human rights advocates argue that the increase of globalization and immigra-
tion has led to a motivation among some in the West to use cultural relativism, politi-
cal correctness, and themes of “tolerance” to justify certain foreign cultural traditions
and practices that they would otherwise deem to be unequivocal violations of interna-
tional human rights. Chesler, Worldwide Trends in Honor Killings, supra note 20. There
can be no justification for honor killing in any open society that values human rights
and the equality of women. Indeed, the Canadian government informs new immi-
grants upon arrival that “Canada’s openness and generosity do not extend to barbaric
cultural practices that tolerate spousal abuse, ‘honour killings,’ female genital mutila-
tion or other gender-based violence. Those guilty of these crimes are severely pun-
ished under Canada’s criminal laws.” Id.
26 ACCORD, PAKISTAN: HONOUR KILLING OF MEN, supra note 12, at 3. Pakistan is
one of the few countries that consistently publishes statistics related to honor killings
in the country, and many such studies are carried out by the Human Rights Commis-
sion of Pakistan. Lasson, supra note 25, at 419.
27 Chesler, Worldwide Trends in Honor Killings, supra note 20.
28 See id.
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have been victims of honor killings in the country.29
According to Mazhar Bagli, a Turkish sociologist who has in-
terviewed nearly 200 people convicted of honor killings, Ahmet
Yildiz’s murder was the first time that the term “honor killing” was
being used to describe a murder motivated by the homosexuality
of the victim.30 Even so, Bagli believed that such a motivation did
not necessarily disqualify the murder as an honor killing, since
“[h]onour killings cleanse illicit relationships. For women, that is a
broad term. Men are allowed more sexual freedom, but homosexu-
ality is still seen by some as beyond the pale.”31 While Yildiz’s par-
ents loved their son, his decision to be honest about his
homosexuality was “the ultimate affront to both religious and filial
honor.”32
Men are not often individually targeted for honor killings;
eighty-one percent are killed along with their female companion.33
The honor killing of a couple is often carried out by the family of
the accused woman and is done to protect and restore that family’s
honor.34 Between January and November 2009 in Pakistan, there
were twenty-two incidents of both members of a male-female
couple killed for honor, most often at the hands of a family mem-
ber of the female.35 In January 2010, a young couple was clubbed
to death by the woman’s family because the family did not approve
of their marriage.36 Both bodies were left hanging in the couple’s
village to ensure that the community was aware that the family had
restored its honor.37 There was even an incident in 2009 where a
family who disapproved of their daughter’s marriage killed only the
husband.38
Between January and March 2009, there were fifty-three re-
ported honor killings in the Sindh province of Pakistan, thirteen of
29 Palash R. Ghosh, Honor Killings: The Scourge of Turkey, ASSYRIAN INT’L NEWS
AGENCY (Oct. 7, 2011, 9:06:25 PM), http://www.aina.org/news/20110710160625.htm.
30 Birch, supra note 1.
31 Id.
32 Bilefsky, supra note 2.
33 Chesler, Worldwide Trends in Honor Killings, supra note 20.
34 See ACCORD, PAKISTAN: HONOUR KILLING OF MEN, supra note 12, at 4.
35 HUMAN RIGHTS COMM’N OF PAKISTAN, STATE OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN 2009, at
196–204 (Adnan Adil ed., 2010), available at http://hrcp-web.org/hrcpweb/wp-con-
tent/ar/pdf/ar09e.pdf.
36 HUMAN RIGHTS COMM’N OF PAKISTAN, STATE OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN 2010, at 207
(Najam U Din ed., 2011), available at http://hrcp-web.org/hrcpweb/wp-content/
pdf/ar/ar10e.pdf.
37 Id.
38 Id. at 204.
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which had male victims.39 This was a vast decrease from the first
few months of 2008, when there were 550 reported honor killings
in the same province, 96 of which had male victims.40 Over a pe-
riod of ten months in 2007, a staggering 104 men were reported
killed in the Sindh province for “harming family honour.”41
The name for “honor killing” varies around the world, but in
the Sindh province it is referred to as karo kali, whereby karo refers
to the dishonored man and kali refers to the dishonored woman.42
Another term used to describe an honor killing is tor tora, which is
used in the North-West Frontier Province of Pakistan; tor refers to
the accused man and tora to the accused woman.43 These transla-
tions demonstrate that communities in Pakistan, in which honor
killings are tragically common, understand the murders to be di-
rected at both women and men.
C. Honor Killings versus Domestic Violence
For purposes of an asylum claim, it is important to understand
the distinction between honor killings and domestic violence. For
asylum seekers who fear being returned to a country in which they
will suffer domestic violence, the main difficulty is that asylum
courts generally view such abuse not as persecution but as a form
of private violence.44 Thus, while this Note is not intended to lend
itself to the argument against recognizing domestic violence as a
form of persecution worthy of asylum, it is important to distinguish
honor killings from forms of violence considered to be purely “pri-
vate,” such as domestic violence.
According to the Office of Violence Against Women, an
agency of the U.S. Department of Justice, domestic violence is “a
pattern of abusive behavior that is used by an intimate partner to
gain or maintain power and control over the other intimate part-
ner.”45 Honor killings, however, are strikingly different. They are
39 ACCORD, PAKISTAN: HONOUR KILLING OF MEN, supra note 12, at 1–2.
40 Id. at 4.
41 Id. at 2.
42 See id.
43 Id.
44 See, e.g., Marisa Silenzi Cianciarulo, Batterers as Agents of the State: Challenging the
Public/Private Distinction in Intimate Partner Violence-Based Asylum Claims, 35 HARV. J.L. &
GENDER 117, 120 (2012) (arguing that American asylum courts are hesitant to extend
asylum to a woman who comes from a male-dominated society that condones and
encourages violence against women because they view her abuse “not [as] a political
act but merely an unfortunate situation that has occurred due to various psychologi-
cal and social factors”).
45 OFFICE ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ABOUT THE OFFICE
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uniquely motivated by moral and behavioral codes “that typify
some cultures, often reinforced by fundamentalist religious dic-
tates.”46 They are rarely committed spontaneously, in a fit of rage,
by a single individual, but instead often involve careful planning by
multiple family members.47 According to Zaynab Nawaz, who has
worked on the women’s rights programs with both Amnesty Inter-
national and Open Society Foundations, “[f]emales in the family—
mothers, mothers-in-law, sisters, and cousins—frequently support
the attacks. It’s a community mentality.”48 And ultimately, the pur-
pose of the killing fits within a clear framework of the restoration
of family honor.49
Perhaps the most glaring distinction between honor killings
and domestic violence is that those who carry out honor killings
generally do so in an environment in which they are expected to
perform this act of restoring dishonor to their family’s tarnished
reputation. Honor killings will not be eradicated until there is a
cultural shift and the relevant societies no longer encourage or ap-
prove of such violence. Until then, male relatives have the approval
from an accused woman’s family and large sections of the popula-
tion to beat, stab, and shoot the accused woman.50 For example,
not only did the prosecutor’s office refuse to take Ahmet Yildiz’s
complaints of death threats seriously, but Yildiz’s family refused to
attend his burial, which, sadly is a very common response by the
family of an honor killing victim.51 By contrast, the American legal
system and the American public rarely tolerate the murder of
daughters, sisters, and mothers for their sexual conduct—real or
perceived.52
Since domestic violence involves the abuse of one intimate
ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN (n.d.), http://www.ovw.usdoj.gov/docs/about-ovw-fact-
sheet.pdf (last visited Apr. 4, 2013).
46 Chesler, Worldwide Trends in Honor Killings, supra note 20.
47 Chesler, Are Honor Killings Simply Domestic Violence?, supra note 14.
48 Hillary Mayell, Thousands of Women Killed for Family “Honor,” NAT’L GEO. NEWS
(Feb. 12, 2002), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2002/02/0212_020212_
honorkilling.html.
49 Chesler, Are Honor Killings Simply Domestic Violence?, supra note 14.
50 See HONORING THE KILLERS, supra note 10, at 2 (explaining that not only does
the society at large stand by while male relatives physically harm accused women, but
the police themselves often treat these men as vindicated in their actions, and as such,
honor crimes are rarely investigated by law enforcement).
51 Birch, supra note 1.
52 See Lama Abu-Odeh, Comparatively Speaking: The “Honor” of the “East” and the “Pas-
sion” of the “West,” 1997 UTAH L. REV. 287, 291 (1997); Chesler, Are Honor Killings
Simply Domestic Violence?, supra note 14 (explaining that Americans generally perceive
batterer-murderers as criminals, not heroes).
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partner by another, there are rarely multiple victims. However,
when it comes to honor killings, the targeted woman is not always
the sole victim. Studies show that in Islamic countries, nearly one
quarter of honor killings involve additional victims, including the
woman’s husband, fiance´, children, siblings, or parents.53
Examining the differences between honor killings and domes-
tic violence is not only crucial to understanding how honor killings
can be prevented and dealt with; the distinction between these two
forms of violence is specifically important when it comes to fram-
ing this type of persecution for asylum purposes. As the next sec-
tion of this Note explains, not all violence is viewed as
“persecution,” and one crucial distinction relates to the exclusively
private nature of the harm and the absence of government involve-
ment, both of which can be difficult hurdles for asylum applicants
with honor killing claims.
II. ASYLUM CLAIMS BASED ON THE THREAT OF AN HONOR KILLING
Ruling on asylum claims often involves having an immigration
judge “examine the fear of ‘potential’ harm based on a cultural
and societal practice that is so foreign to the American way of
life.”54 This is especially true in the case of honor killings, and the
decisions of U.S. courts denying these asylum claims reflect “a deep
ignorance regarding the severity and prevalence of honor killings
abroad.”55 Yet despite the lack of understanding of the practice
and the cultural traditions that allow it to persist, the unique na-
ture of honor killings makes it particularly difficult for these claims
to meet the strict standards under asylum law. This section begins
with an overview of the necessary elements of an asylum claim and
then focuses on the outcomes of the honor killing cases that have
been heard by the U.S. Courts of Appeals, exploring the difficulties
faced by potential honor killing victims in satisfying these factors. It
concludes with an overview of the honor killing asylum claims that
have been brought by male applicants.
A. The Elements of an Asylum Claim
In order to be eligible for asylum, the applicant must show
that his or her “life or freedom” would be threatened if the appli-
cant were to return to his or her country of origin because the
applicant would be persecuted on account of his or her race, relig-
53 Chesler, Worldwide Trends in Honor Killings, supra note 20.
54 Shapiro, supra note 9, at 295 (footnote omitted).
55 Id. at 307.
2013] HONOR KILLINGS AND ASYLUM EQUALITY 243
ion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or politi-
cal opinion.56 The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) has
defined “persecution” as including “a threat to the life or freedom
of, or the infliction of suffering or harm upon, those who differ in
a way regarded as offensive.”57 Similarly, the United Nations High
Commission for Refugees’ Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for
Determining Refugee Status states that persecution always includes “a
threat to life” or “[o]ther serious violations of human rights.”58
The applicant can demonstrate a “well-founded fear of future
persecution” by showing that (1) the applicant has suffered from
past persecution, (2) there is a reasonable possibility that the appli-
cant will be persecuted, or (3) the applicant’s home country has a
pattern or practice of persecuting other individuals who are mem-
bers of a statutorily defined group of which the applicant is also a
member.59
B. Case Survey
The research for this Note concluded that, at the level of the
circuit courts, there has been a total of twenty-two cases in which
the applicant claimed asylum based on the fear of becoming the
victim of an honor killing.60 Of these twenty-two cases, the claims
were brought by twelve men61 and ten women.62 The majority of
56 See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A) (2012).
57 Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 222 (B.I.A. 1985), 1985 WL 56042, over-
ruled by Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987) (overruling Matter of Acosta
insofar as it held that the “clear probability” of persecution standard for withholding
of removal was equal to the “well-founded fear” of persecution standard for asylum).
58 U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determin-
ing Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees, ¶ 51, U.N. Doc. HCR/1P/4/Eng/Rev.1 (Jan. 1992), available at http://www.
unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3314.html.
59 8 C.F.R § 208.13(b)(1), (b)(2)(i) and (iii) (2013).
60 This case survey was conducted by entering the following search query in the
WestlawNext database, setting “All States” and “All Federal” as the jurisdictions: “asy-
lum” AND “honor killing.” It is quite possible that there are more cases in which the
persecution feared by the asylum applicant was the same as an honor killing in every
way except in name. However, the only feasible way to conduct this case survey was to
only include the cases in which the applicant or the court used the term “honor kill-
ing” to describe the form of persecution.
61 See Jabri v. Holder, 675 F.3d 20, 22 (1st Cir. 2012); Bal v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 406
F. App’x 640, 641 (3d Cir. 2011); Ahmed v. Holder, 611 F.3d 90, 93 (1st Cir. 2010); Al
Bustami v. Holder, 385 F. App’x 719, 720 (9th Cir. 2010); Ghouri v. Holder, 618 F.3d
68, 68 (1st Cir. 2010); Abdelghani v. Holder, 309 F. App’x 19, 20 (7th Cir. 2009); Al-
Ghorbani v. Holder, 585 F.3d 980, 983 (6th Cir. 2009); Jamil v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 327
F. App’x 336, 337 (3d Cir. 2009); Khalili v. Holder, 557 F.3d 429, 431 (6th Cir. 2009);
Haimour v. Gonzales, 165 F. App’x 594, 595 (10th Cir. 2006); Wawi v. Ashcroft, 91 F.
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the claims were brought by Jordanian63 and Pakistani people.64
Two claims were brought by Lebanese65 and Turkish people, re-
spectively,66 and the remaining claims were brought by individuals
from Yemen,67 Syria,68 Iraq,69 Egypt,70 and Indonesia.71 While most
of the claims were brought by individual applicants, five of them
were brought jointly with at least one other immediate family
member.72
Asylum was denied in all twenty-two cases. However, withhold-
ing of removal was explicitly granted to the claimants in two
cases.73 Furthermore, in three cases, the court remanded the cases
for reconsideration of the applicants’ claims.74 Thus, in seventeen
of the twenty-two honor killings cases that have been heard by the
circuit courts, the applicants’ claims for relief from removal were
denied.
A common reason given by the courts for the denial of the
App’x 493, 493 (6th Cir. 2004); Suhardy v. Ashcroft, 263 F.3d 162 (Table), 2001 WL
803648, at *1 (5th Cir. 2001).
62 See Abraham v. Holder, 647 F.3d 626, 628 (7th Cir. 2011); Sarhan v. Holder, 658
F.3d 649, 651 (7th Cir. 2011); Suradi v. Holder, 437 F. App’x 549, 550 (9th Cir. 2011);
Badawy v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 390 F. App’x 165, 166 (3d Cir. 2010); Reda v. Att’y Gen.
of U.S., 366 F. App’x 415, 417 (3d Cir. 2010); Fatima v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 332 F.
App’x 784, 784 (3d Cir. 2009); Dia v. Mukasey, 292 F. App’x 468, 469 (6th Cir. 2008);
Vellani v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 296 F. App’x 870, 871 (11th Cir. 2008); Aziz v. Gonzales,
478 F.3d 854, 856 (8th Cir. 2007); Yaylacicegi v. Gonzales, 175 F. App’x 33, 33–34 (7th
Cir. 2006).
63 See Jabri, 675 F.3d at 22; Sarhan, 658 F.3d at 651; Suradi, 437 F. App’x at 550; Al
Bustami, 385 F. App’x at 720; Abdelghani, 309 F. App’x at 20; Khalili, 557 F.3d at 431;
Haimour, 165 F. App’x at 595; Wawi, 91 F. App’x at 493.
64 See Ahmed, 611 F.3d at 92; Ghouri, 618 F.3d at 68; Fatima, 332 F. App’x at 784;
Jamil, 327 F. App’x at 337; Vellani, 296 F. App’x at 871.
65 See Reda, 366 F. App’x at 416; Dia, 292 F. App’x at 469.
66 See Bal, 406 F. App’x at 641; Yaylacicegi, 175 F. App’x at 34.
67 See Al-Ghorbani v. Holder, 585 F.3d 980, 983 (6th Cir. 2009).
68 See Abraham v. Holder, 647 F.3d 626, 628 (7th Cir. 2011).
69 See Aziz v. Gonzales, 478 F.3d 854, 856 (8th Cir. 2007).
70 See Badawy v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 390 F. App’x 165, 166 (3d Cir. 2010).
71 See Suhardy v. Ashcroft, 263 F.3d 162 (Table), 2001 WL 803648, at *1 (5th Cir.
2001).
72 See Sarhan v. Holder, 658 F.3d 649, 651 (7th Cir. 2011) (applicant’s husband);
Ahmed v. Holder, 611 F.3d 90, 93 (1st Cir. 2010) (applicant’s wife); Al Bustami v.
Holder, 385 F. App’x 719, 720 (9th Cir. 2010) (applicant’s wife); Al-Ghorbani, 585 F.3d
980 at 983 (applicant’s brother); Yaylacicegi v. Gonzales, 175 F. App’x 33, 33 (7th Cir.
2006) (applicant’s husband and child).
73 See Sarhan, 658 F.3d at 651; Al-Ghorbani, 585 F.3d at 984. The Seventh Circuit in
Sarhan held that the female applicant was entitled to withholding of removal but re-
manded the case to the BIA to determine whether such relief extended to her hus-
band as well. Sarhan, 658 F.3d at 651.
74 See Jabri v. Holder, 675 F.3d 20, 26 (1st Cir. 2012); Suradi v. Holder, 437 F.
App’x 549, 553 (9th Cir. 2011); Al Bustami, 385 F. App’x at 721.
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claims was that the applicant had not presented enough evidence
to show that he or she would actually be killed if deported.75 The
courts also denied the claims because of the applicant’s lack of
credibility,76 the frivolous nature of the claim,77 and a complete
lack of evidence supporting any element of the claim.78 However,
several of the claims were denied after the courts concluded that
the applicants had not met their burden of proving that their
claims satisfied the various legal elements of an asylum claim.
i. Showing Membership in a Particular Social Group
A fundamental, yet difficult, argument an asylum applicant
may have to make is that he or she will be persecuted on the basis
of his or her membership in a particular social group. Like other
forms of persecution that occur in the private sphere, honor killing
claims pose the additional difficulty of proving the persecutor’s in-
tent, since the threat of death must be on account of the appli-
cant’s membership in a particular social group rather than purely
personal reasons.79
The BIA has interpreted “particular social group” to be de-
fined “by common characteristics that members of the group ei-
ther cannot change, or should not be required to change because
such characteristics are fundamental to their individual identi-
ties.”80 Proving membership in a particular social group is compli-
cated by the BIA’s resistance to “classify[ing] people who are
targets of persecution as members of a particular social group
when they have little or nothing in common beyond being
75 See Abraham v. Holder, 647 F.3d 626, 634 (7th Cir. 2011); Bal v. Att’y Gen. of
U.S., 406 F. App’x 640, 643 (3d Cir. 2011); Ghouri v. Holder, 618 F.3d 68, 70 (1st Cir.
2010); Reda v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 366 F. App’x 415, 418 (3d Cir. 2010); Abdelghani v.
Holder, 309 F. App’x 19, 20 (7th Cir. 2009); Fatima v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 332 F. App’x
784, 786 (3d Cir. 2009); Dia v. Mukasey, 292 F. App’x 468, 471 (6th Cir. 2008); Wawi
v. Ashcroft, 91 F. App’x 493, 494 (6th Cir. 2004).
76 See Abraham, 647 F.3d at 633; Dia, 292 F. App’x at 471; Aziz v. Gonzales, 478 F.3d
854, 858 (8th Cir. 2007).
77 See Aziz, 478 F.3d at 858.
78 Ahmed v. Holder, 611 F.3d 90, 96 (1st Cir. 2010); Badawy v. Att’y Gen. of U.S.,
390 F. App’x 165, 167 (3d Cir. 2010).
79 See Doyle, supra note 9, at 531 (arguing that discounting forms of persecution
that occur within the private sphere, such as domestic violence, forced marriage,
honor killings, and female genital mutilation as “private” violence not worthy of asy-
lum protection is an outdated view that is inconsistent with the recognition of gender-
based persecution, which so often occurs in the private sphere).
80 Fauziya Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 366 (B.I.A. 1996) (determining that having
intact genitalia was fundamental to the applicant’s identity).
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targets.”81 That is to say, an asylum applicant cannot use the threat
of a particular form of persecution as the characteristic that unites
him or her with other individuals facing the threat of that same
form of persecution. Additionally, the BIA prohibits courts from
simply creating a particular social group; it must be a group cur-
rently recognized in that country as a social subdivision in the
culture.82
Some have postulated that “particular social group” has be-
come “a malleable catch-all category for claims not falling squarely
within one of the other enumerated grounds.”83 Indeed, the BIA’s
designation of the applicant’s “particular social group” in Fauziya
Kasinga,84 championed as the first asylum case recognizing female
genital mutilation (FGM) as a form of persecution, was limited to
“young women of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe who ha[d] not
had FGM, as practiced by that tribe, and who oppose[d] the prac-
tice.”85 That holding has been criticized for “the narrowness of the
recognized social group and the opinion’s failure to provide rules
for similar future cases” as well as the appearance that the BIA de-
fined the social group so narrowly “in order to aid the [BIA] in
granting asylum by alleviating fears of a potential slippery slope.”86
It is thus unsurprising that the “particular social group” ele-
ment of an asylum claim would prove to be equally troublesome in
honor killing cases. This obstacle was unsuccessfully faced by the
asylum applicant in Haimour v. Gonzales.87 While he was living in
Jordan, Haimour had committed adultery with an engaged wo-
man.88 After their sexual relationship became known to the wo-
81 Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611, 616 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing, as an example, debt-
ors of the same creditor).
82 See R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 918 (B.I.A. 1999) (denying asylum to a Guatemalan
woman whose husband physically and sexually abused her because the claimant had
not shown that women in Guatemala who suffered from spousal abuse viewed them-
selves as being members of a particular social group, nor did the men who abused
their wives recognize their female victims as a social group).
83 Plant, supra note 9, at 118. See also Arthur C. Helton, Persecution on Account of
Membership in a Social Group as a Basis for Refugee Status, 15 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV.
39, 45 (1983) (arguing that “particular social group” was indeed intended to be a catch-
all provision that “could include all the bases for and types of persecution which an
imaginative despot might conjure up”).
84 21 I. & N. Dec. 357 (B.I.A. 1996).
85 Id. at 358.
86 Plant, supra note 9, at 119–20. Indeed, Plant points out that it is not likely that
the Togolese themselves would recognize the social group created by the BIA in Kas-
inga, a prerequisite that the BIA has determined to be a crucial factor in any court-
created social group. See id. at 120; R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 918.
87 165 Fed. App’x 594 (10th Cir. 2006).
88 Id. at 595.
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man’s fiance´, the fiance´’s family vowed to kill Haimour for
bringing disgrace upon them.89 When Haimour appealed to the
Tenth Circuit, he argued that he would be persecuted on account
of his membership in the following social group: “a person who has
had sexual relations outside marriage and thereby brought dis-
honor upon the Abu Al-Fadel tribe or family.”90 The court rejected
Hamour’s proposed social group for two reasons. First, the court
reasoned that being an adulterer is not a protected characteristic.91
Second, the woman’s fiance´ did not want to kill all men who had
committed adultery; his threats were limited to Haimour, which in
turn made Haimour’s claimed social group “limited to himself.”92
The BIA made a similar argument when it held that an appli-
cant’s proposed social group was limited to herself since her
brother had only threatened to kill her for her alleged adultery
and not every woman who had similarly dishonored their families.93
However, the Seventh Circuit rejected this reasoning on appeal,
instead making the following analogy: a neo-Nazi who burns down
the home of an African-American family does not do so because of
a personal dispute with the family,94 but because of the family’s
race and the perceived suffering to the neo-Nazi if no action is
taken. Thus, it is important that the courts take into account the
cultural context in which honor killings occur rather than focusing
solely on the private parties involved.
That case posed a further problem for the applicant’s pro-
posed social group—should it matter whether the targeted individ-
ual actually committed the act for which she will be persecuted?
The female applicant feared becoming the victim of an honor kill-
ing after she had been accused of adultery, which she claimed was
a rumor invented by a vindictive in-law.95 The Immigration Judge
and the BIA had rejected the applicant’s claim that she was a mem-
ber of a particular social group for asylum purposes, holding that
“Muslim women falsely accused of adultery” did not satisfy the stat-
ute.96 However, the Seventh Circuit reversed the decision on ap-
peal and granted withholding of removal to the applicant, holding
that “the truth or falsity of the accusations against the woman who
89 Id.
90 Id. at 597.
91 Id. at 598.
92 Id.
93 See Sarhan v. Holder, 658 F.3d 649, 656 (7th Cir. 2011).
94 See id. at 656–57.
95 See id. at 651.
96 Id. at 654 (emphasis in original).
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is targeted for an honor killing makes no difference.”97 The court
instead determined that the applicant’s social group was “women
in Jordan who have (allegedly) flouted repressive moral norms,
and thus who face a high risk of honor killing.”98
ii. Showing that the Government Is Unwilling or Unable to
Prevent the Harm
Navi Pillay, the High Commissioner for Human Rights at the
United Nations, believes that honor killings are often viewed as a
form of private family violence that is not included in the frame-
work of international human rights, but that the same crimes
would be condemned and punished if they were committed against
strangers instead of family members.99 The perception of honor
killings as a form of revenge carried out by one private actor
against another poses a significant difficulty for asylum claimants
because “[a]sylum is not available to an alien who fears retribution
solely over personal matters.”100 Without demonstrating a nexus to a
government system of persecution, “[p]urely personal retribution
is, of course, not persecution.”101
Because there must be a nexus between the government and
the persecution—the persecution can be directly or indirectly at-
tributed to the government, through the government’s affirmative
action or lack thereof—asylum seekers facing a threat of persecu-
tion that is commonly seen as a private act of violence are tasked
with using the language of the public sphere to frame such vio-
lence.102 “Persecution is something a government does, either di-
97 Id.
98 Id. at 655.
99 See Impunity for Domestic Violence, ‘Honour Killings’ Cannot Continue – UN Official,
UN NEWS CENTRE (Mar. 4, 2010), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=
33971&Cr=violence+against+women&Cr1 (“[T]here is a clear State responsibility . . .
to prevent, protect and provide redress—regardless of sex, and regardless of a per-
son’s status in the family.”).
100 See Zoarab v. Mukasey, 524 F.3d 777, 781 (6th Cir. 2008) (emphasis added) (de-
nying asylum because the harm feared by the applicant at the hands of an Emirati
prince who owned a bank in which the applicant had invested was a result of the
applicant’s outburst as an angry investor, not as a political dissident).
101 See Grava v. INS, 205 F.3d 1177, 1181 n.3 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding that the death
threats faced by a Filipino law enforcement officer who acted as a “whistleblower” by
uncovering and testifying about government corruption could constitute
persecution).
102 See Lucy Akinyi Orinda, Securing Gender-Based Persecution Claims: A Proposed
Amendment to Asylum Law, 17 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 665, 673–74 (2011) (explain-
ing that asylum law tends to protect people from “public” harm instead of rape and
other forms of sexual abuse, which are considered forms of “private” violence because
they are committed in the “private” sphere).
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rectly or by abetting (and thus becoming responsible for) private
discrimination by throwing in its lot with the deeds or by providing
protection so ineffectual that it becomes a sensible inference that
the government sponsors the misconduct.”103 In sum, persecution
can be inflicted by a government or a private party that the govern-
ment is “unwilling or unable to control.”104
However, the Sixth Circuit has held that a claimant cannot
prove that a government is unwilling or unable to control honor
killings in the country simply by proving that honor killings exist in
the country.105 While still living in Turkey, every aspect of
Mehriban Yaylacicegi’s life was controlled by her two brothers, who
would abuse her when she disobeyed their orders or led them to
believe she had done so.106 When Yaylacicegi used the phone with-
out her brothers’ permission, they attacked her with a knife; when
she showed up at home not wearing the traditional Muslim cloth-
ing demanded by her brothers, they beat her until she could no
longer move or speak.107 After she came to the United States with
her new husband, she converted to Christianity. She feared that if
she returned to Turkey, her brothers would surely kill her for aban-
doning the religious beliefs they had previously imposed on her.108
Despite presenting evidence of the prevalence of honor kill-
ings in Turkey and law enforcement’s minimal effort to prevent or
prosecute the crimes, Yaylacicegi was unable to convince the court
that she faced persecution. Such a precedent makes it especially
difficult for applicants to prove that their home governments are
accountable for the threatened persecution. Since mere proof that
honor killings occur in a country is not sufficient, the asylum claim-
ant must demonstrate a direct link between the occurrence of
honor killings and the government’s unwillingness or inability to
prevent them.109
The foreign judiciary’s response to honor killings in the appli-
cant’s country of origin is an important factor. For example, Mus-
tafa Bal’s in-laws, who disapproved of his marriage to a woman in
103 See Hor v. Gonzalez, 400 F.3d 482, 485 (7th Cir. 2005) (emphasis in original)
(denying asylum to an Algerian man who feared being killed by a rebel group because
the applicant was not only aligned with the government, but the government was
trying to thwart the rebel group’s efforts).
104 Fauziya Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 365 (B.I.A. 1996).
105 See Yaylacicegi v. Gonzales, 175 F. App’x 33, 35–36 (7th Cir. 2006).
106 See id. at 34.
107 Id.
108 Id. at 35.
109 See id. at 36 (holding that Yaylacicegi had not persuaded the court that the Turk-
ish government was unwilling or unable to protect her from an honor killing).
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their family, had beaten and threatened to kill him.110 Nonethe-
less, the Third Circuit denied Bal’s honor killing asylum claim be-
cause Turkey had outlawed honor killings and imposed life
imprisonment for the crime, which the court believed showed that
the Turkish government would be able or willing to prevent his
murder.111
A common source of information used by both parties for evi-
dence of a government’s unwillingness or inability to prevent
honor killings is the U.S. State Department’s Country Reports on
Human Rights Practices. Yet in the case of honor killing asylum
claims, the use of these reports has been very favorable to the U.S.
government in opposing the claimants’ arguments for relief from
removal. For example, even though an expert testified that the
Turkish police usually would not become involved in preventing
honor killings, the Immigration Judge who initially denied
Mehriban Yaylacicegi’s asylum claim relied on the U.S. State De-
partment’s 2002 Country Report on Human Rights Practices in
Turkey, which showed that the applicant could obtain protection
from the civil authorities in the country.112
The U.S. government’s use of similar evidence relating to the
Jordanian government’s response to honor killings led to similar
results. In 2009, the Sixth Circuit held in Khalili v. Holder113 that
Hamdi Al Khalili, a Jordanian male, failed to show that the
Jordanian government was unwilling or unable to prevent him
from becoming the victim of an honor killing at the hands of his
wife’s family.114 Khalili testified that he believed the government
would not protect him because “usually they don’t interfere [with]
honor things.”115 The court found the State Department’s 2005
Country Report on Human Rights Practices in Jordan instructive in
its decision; the reported concluded that of the fifteen honor
crimes reported in 2004, the Jordanian authorities had prosecuted
all of them.116 The court acknowledged the reality that the
Jordanian legal system provided loopholes and lenient sentences
for those accused of honor crimes, yet held that the “societal
trend” toward the condemnation of honor crimes weakened
110 See Bal v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 406 F. App’x 640, 642–43 (3d Cir. 2011).
111 Id. at 643.
112 See Yaylacicegi v. Gonzales, 175 F. App’x 33, 35 (7th Cir. 2006).
113 557 F.3d 429 (6th Cir. 2009).
114 See id. at 436.
115 Id. at 431–32.
116 Id. at 436.
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Khalili’s claim.117
Yet two years after Khalili, both the Seventh and Ninth Circuits
determined that the Jordanian government was unable or unwill-
ing to prevent the honor killings anticipated by two Jordanian wo-
men who brought asylum claims. First came Suradi v. Holder,118 in
which Iman Khalil Suradi claimed that due to the extramarital af-
fairs she had had while in the United States, both her husband and
her own family had threatened to kill her in order to cleanse the
dishonor she had brought upon them.119 Like the Sixth Circuit’s
holding in Khalili, the Immigration Judge in Suradi’s case had
found that the Jordanian government was not unwilling or unable
to prevent her honor killing, since the U.S. State Department’s
Country Report on Human Rights Practices in Jordan showed that
the Jordanian authorities had prosecuted all of the honor crimes
that had been reported in 2008.120 Yet on appeal, the Ninth Circuit
held that it was error to place such heavy reliance on that report,
since honor killings are drastically underreported (and often unre-
ported) and just because the government had prosecuted the six-
teen reported honor killings did not mean that there had only
been sixteen honor killings.121 Additionally, the court noted that
the Jordanian media had reported on far more than sixteen honor
killings, which further weakened the reliance on the statistics from
the State Department’s report.122
The Ninth Circuit further held that even if the Jordanian gov-
ernment did prosecute every single honor killing that was commit-
ted in the country, it would not show that the government was able
or willing to prevent them from occurring in the first place.123 The
court relied on a Human Rights Watch report that concluded that
“[p]olice rarely investigate ‘honor’ killings, seldom take any initia-
tive to deter these crimes, and typically treat the killers as vindi-
cated men.”124 And as for the lenient sentences for honor killings
in Jordan, the Ninth Circuit noted that the government had
blocked efforts at reform, with the Jordanian parliament itself re-
fusing to repeal the leniency provisions because it believed that
tougher sanctions would encourage more adultery in the coun-
117 See id.
118 437 Fed. App’x 549 (9th Circ. 2011).
119 See id. at 551–52.
120 See id. at 552.
121 See id.
122 See id.
123 See id.
124 Id. at 552–53.
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try.125 The Ninth Circuit ultimately held that both the Immigration
Judge and the BIA had “misread” the State Department’s report,
and thus remanded Suradi’s case for further factfinding.126
Three months later, in Sarhan v. Holder,127 the Seventh Circuit
granted withholding of removal to “Disi,” a Jordanian woman who
also alleged that she would become the victim of an honor killing if
returned to her home country.128 Disi’s story is a complicated trag-
edy that begins with an intense level of animosity between her and
her sister-in-law, Nuha.129 While Disi and her husband were living
in the U.S., Nuha started a rumor in Jordan that Disi had commit-
ted adultery, thus bringing dishonor upon the family.130 Upon
hearing the allegation, Disi’s brother decided that when Disi re-
turned to Jordan, he would kill her in order to restore the family’s
honor.131 He not only told his parents about his plan, but visited
Disi in Chicago in order to personally relay the message.132
Disi testified that her brother had told her that while the laws
of the United States would not permit him to kill her on American
soil, it was a different story in Jordan.133 The Seventh Circuit noted
that Disi’s brother “cannot be deterred from murdering his sister
in response to the rumors Nuha started,” as he was completely ob-
sessed with family honor, and regardless of whether the rumors
were true, his reputation had been harmed in such a way that
“truth no longer matters.”134
The Seventh Circuit’s very explanation of honor killings incor-
porated the “unwilling or unable government” element of the asy-
lum claim; it stated that in countries where honor killings are
commonplace, “government offers little protection for the victims;
and killers receive light punishment, if charges are not dropped
altogether.”135 The court explained that Disi’s brother’s determina-
tion to kill his sister for the shame associated with the circulating
rumor was in large part due to the passive encouragement of a
125 See id. at 553.
126 See id.
127 658 F.3d 649 (7th Cir. 2011).
128 See id. at 651.
129 See id.
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 See id. at 651–52.
133 See id. at 652 (“[W]hen you come back to Jordan, I’m going to kill you. Here [in
the United States], I can’t do, because there is a penalty for this, but in Jordan, no-
body can do for another killing.”).
134 Id. at 651.
135 Id.
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society that deemed the violence permissible and justified, as well
as a government that “has withdrawn its protection from the
victims.”136
As was the case in both Khalili and Suradi, the U.S. govern-
ment argued against relief from removal by using the State Depart-
ment’s Country Report on Human Rights Practices in Jordan; and
like the other reports, the one used in Disi’s case showed that the
Jordanian authorities had prosecuted all of the seventeen honor
crimes that had been reported in 2007.137 Yet the Seventh Circuit
labeled the information “unconvincing,” instead holding that
“[p]rosecution at times is an empty gesture” and calling the six-
month sentences for honor killings “little more than a slap on the
wrist.”138 By focusing on the punishment for honor killings, rather
than the rate of prosecution, the court was able to support the con-
tention that leniency in the judicial system supports the govern-
ment’s toleration of the violence.
iii. Showing an Inability to Relocate
The Eighth Circuit has held that, for purposes of an asylum
claim, “[r]elocating to another part of the country does not mean
living in hiding.”139 Yet in Vellani v. United States Attorney General,140
the Eleventh Circuit held that the applicant had not proven that
her honor killing could not be avoided by simply relocating within
her country of origin.141 After becoming engaged in her home
country of Pakistan, Zehra Vellani joined her fiance´ in the U.S.,
where he forced her to perform oral sex on him.142 But when Vel-
lani refused to have sexual intercourse with her fiance´, he told her
brother that he would not marry Vellani because she had a boy-
friend and was a “loose woman.”143 Consequently, Vellani’s brother
moved his family away from the home he had shared with his sister
in Pakistan, claiming that he did not want his sister’s dishonor af-
fecting the honor of his own daughter.144 Vellani testified that after
her fiance´ falsely accused her of having a boyfriend, her brother
136 Id. at 656.
137 Id. at 658.
138 Id.
139 See Agbor v. Gonzales, 487 F.3d 499, 505 (7th Cir. 2007) (finding that the appli-
cant, whose mother-in-law threatened to poison the applicant if she did not undergo
FGM, would not have been able to safely relocate in Cameroon).
140 296 F. App’x 870 (11th Cir. 2008).
141 See id. at 877.
142 Id. at 872.
143 Id.
144 Id.
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threatened to kill her.145
Despite this, the Eleventh Circuit held that “it is irrelevant that
honor killings occur throughout Pakistan, as Vellani has not ar-
gued that people throughout Pakistan wish to kill her to avenge
the dishonor of her family.”146 The court stressed that it was only
Vellani’s brother, and no other family members or members of the
community, who had threatened to kill her; furthermore, Vellani’s
brother had not threatened to track her down wherever she was in
Pakistan.147
Thankfully, the result was different for Disi, the claimant in
Sarhan v. Holder.148 In granting withholding of removal to Disi, the
Seventh Circuit held that it would not be possible for her to relo-
cate to another part of the country in order to avoid becoming the
victim of an honor killing.149 The court stressed that Disi’s home
country of Jordan, which is the size of Maine, was so small that the
only way Disi could avoid her brother—who intended to “track her
down no matter where she is within Jordan”150—was to “live in hid-
ing,” an ongoing action that simply does not constitute mere “relo-
cation.”151 While the decision in Sarhan is certainly commendable,
its fault lies in the gendered definition of “honor killing” used by
the court, since the way in which this form of persecution is framed
can place male applicants at a severe disadvantage at having their
honor killing asylum claims recognized.
C. Honor Killing Asylum Claims Brought by Men
When the Seventh Circuit granted withholding of removal to
Disi, it expressly distinguished its holding from the Sixth Circuit’s
decision to deny any form of relief to the male applicant in Khalili
v. Holder.152 “The obvious difference between that case and this one
is that the petitioner in the Sixth Circuit was not a female, and the
problem we have identified is one that concerns violence by men
against women.”153 Similar minimization of the risk of honor killings
145 Id. at 874.
146 Id. at 877.
147 See id.
148 658 F.3d 649 (7th Cir. 2011).
149 See id. at 661.
150 Id. at 661–62.
151 See id. at 661.
152 557 F.3d 429, 431 (6th Cir. 2009). Unlike the Immigration Judge and the BIA,
which both held that there was no evidence that honor killings extended to men, the
Sixth Circuit denied Khalili’s claim on other grounds. Id. at 436.
153 Sarhan v. Holder, 658 F.3d 649, 660 (7th Cir. 2011) (emphasis added).
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extending to men has contributed to the denial of the honor kill-
ing asylum claims of three other men.
For example, although Yasser Abdelghani testified that several
members of his family threatened to kill him because he did not
prevent his sister from marrying an American Christian man,154 the
Seventh Circuit denied his claim because the U.S. Department of
State’s Country Report on Human Rights Practices in Jordan de-
fined an honor crime as the “violent assault with intent to kill
against a female by a relative for her immodest behavior or alleged
sexual misconduct.”155
Similarly, the Sixth Circuit (in a decision prior to Khalili) de-
nied any relief from deportation for Mohammed Al Wawi, who
claimed that his extramarital affair with a woman made him fear
that the woman’s family would kill him in order to preserve their
honor.156 The court held that Wawi had not offered any objective
evidence supporting his contention that honor killings extended to
men.157
Khurram Jamil also failed to convince the Third Circuit that
honor killings extended to men.158 Jamil’s wife wanted a divorce,
and Jamil complied; Jamil’s former father-in-law, however, was out-
raged because he believed that Jamil had instigated the divorce.159
The former father-in-law was associated with the Pakistani military
and he sent soldiers to Jamil’s house several times to look for Jamil
and threaten his family.160 Jamil feared that his former father-in-
law would kill him if he returned to Pakistan, especially after the
soldiers promised Jamil’s father that they would make sure he
never saw Jamil again.161 Nonetheless, the Third Circuit empha-
sized that the U.S. State Department’s Country Report on Human
Rights Practices in Pakistan described honor killings as usually in-
volving women.162
Yet there have been two instances in which the circuit courts
have remanded the cases for further consideration where the appli-
cants who feared honor killings were male. In Jabri v. Holder,163 a
Jordanian man feared that his grandfather perceived his conver-
154 See Abdelghani v. Holder, 309 F. App’x 19, 20 (7th Cir. 2009).
155 Id. at 22 (emphasis in original).
156 See Wawi v. Ashcroft, 91 F. App’x 493, 494 (6th Cir. 2004).
157 See id.
158 See Jamil v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 327 F. App’x 336, 337 (3d Cir. 2009).
159 Id. at 337–38.
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 See id. at 339.
163 675 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 2012).
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sion from Islam to Christianity as a disgrace to the family name,
which the applicant feared may provoke an honor killing if he were
to return to Jordan.164 Without making any mention of whether
honor killings can legitimately extend to men, the First Circuit re-
manded the case on the issue of the applicant’s inconsistent testi-
mony.165 In Al Bustami v. Holder,166 a couple jointly alleged a fear of
becoming victims of an honor killing at the hands of the wife’s
family because the couple had had sex before they got married.167
The Ninth Circuit remanded the case for reconsideration of the
husband’s withholding of removal claim, which had been denied
even though his wife’s claim had been granted.168
Furthermore, in Al-Ghorbani v. Holder,169 the Sixth Circuit ex-
plicitly granted withholding of removal to both applicants, a pair of
brothers from Yemen.170 The Al-Ghorbani brothers feared for their
lives after one of the brothers had married a woman of a much
higher social class against the direct orders of the woman’s father,
who also happened to be a general in the Yemeni army.171 While
the BIA dismissed the anticipated honor killing as nothing less
than a “personal vendetta . . . for marrying [the General’s] daugh-
ter without his permission,”172 the Sixth Circuit held that the fear
of persecution was based on the brothers’ membership in a social
group “that opposes the repressive and discriminatory Yemeni cul-
tural and religious customs that prohibit mixed-class marriages and
require paternal consent for marriage.”173 By examining the deci-
sions of the circuit courts in honor killing asylum cases, and specifi-
cally focusing on the definition of “honor killing” used by the
courts, it becomes clear that for male applicants, a gendered defi-
nition of this form of violence can be extremely detrimental to
their claims. The final section of this Note examines the impact of
these definitions more closely and advocates for a gender-neutral
definition of “honor killing” in asylum cases.
164 See id. at 22–23.
165 See id. at 26.
166 385 F. App’x 719 (9th Cir. 2010).
167 See id. at 720.
168 See id.
169 585 F.3d 980 (6th Cir. 2009).
170 See id. at 983–84. Sarhan and Al-Ghorbani are the only cases in which a circuit
court has granted withholding of removal to the applicant bringing an honor killing
asylum claim.
171 Id. at 984–85.
172 See id. at 991.
173 Id. at 996.
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III. ANALYZING HONOR KILLING ASYLUM CLAIMS IN
GENDER-NEUTRAL TERMS
Violence against women has long been ignored as the basis for
legitimate asylum claims; the purpose of this Note is certainly not
to detract from the milestones that have been reached in granting
asylum to women seeking a safe haven from gender-based persecu-
tion. However, it is important to continue to expand the protec-
tions offered by asylum law while keeping in mind that being part
of the small exception to the rule should not invalidate an other-
wise legitimate fear of persecution. In early 2012, the U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice redefined rape to be gender-neutral; explaining
this decision, Senior Advisor to President Obama, Valerie Jarrett
said, “[d]efinitions matter because people matter.”174 Like rape,
honor killings are predominately committed against women, but
they are not exclusively committed against women, unlike FGM or
forced abortion, for example. This distinction is of paramount
importance.
The holdings in the circuit court cases highlight glaring incon-
sistencies in the evaluation of honor killing asylum claims.175 Yet
there is an added level of unpredictability regarding the question
of whether men’s honor killing claims can ever be as valid as wo-
men’s (or valid at all). As the evidence shows, distinguishing the
validity of the claim based on the sex of the applicant is entirely
unwarranted, since it is clear that honor killings are not exclusively
aimed at women.176 As such, relief from removal on the basis of the
fear of an honor killing should not be limited to female applicants.
Male asylum applicants who fear becoming the victims of honor
killings should be afforded the opportunity to prove their case in
the same manner as similarly situated female applicants.
For courts that disregard the possibility of male victims of
honor killings, it is not that the standard is higher for these male
applicants, but that it is impossible. This is unacceptable, and un-
dermines the very purpose of asylum. It is thus necessary for the
courts to apply a gender-neutral definition of honor killing, a deci-
sion that should be encouraged by the federal agencies whose own
decisions and publications are authoritative in asylum cases.
174 US Updates Definition of Rape, REDORBIT (Jan. 9, 2012), http://www.redorbit.
com/news/health/1112451614/us-updates-definition-of-rape/.
175 See supra Part II.B.
176 See supra Part I.B.
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A. The Responsibility of Asylum Courts
There is of course a certain level of unpredictability that is to
be expected when it comes to asylum claims, yet it is quite inappro-
priate for there to be an additional dimension of inconsistency for
asylum claims brought by men, instead of women, for the same
form of persecution. It is unclear why the Sixth Circuit did not
question the sex of the Al-Ghorbani brothers or why it did not de-
fine an honor killing in gendered terms,177 yet this recent honor
killing holding should set the stage for future asylum cases pre-
mised on the fear of this form of persecution.
It would certainly level the playing field for asylum applicants
and remove the inconsistencies among the circuits if the courts be-
gan examining honor killings in the same way as the Al-Ghorbani
court, which chose to focus on the underlying cultural and societal
concepts of family honor, the way it can be tainted, and the accept-
able ways in which honor can be restored.178 The court did not
define honor killings as “violence against women” or in other
gendered terms; instead of focusing on the sex of the potential
honor killing victims, the court stressed that “Yemeni society recog-
nizes a father’s right to control who his daughter marries and per-
mits a father to punish—and even kill—those who defy this
tradition and insult the family honor.”179
Thus, in determining the “particular social group” of which
the Al-Ghorbani brothers were members, the Sixth Circuit focused
on the motivation of the perpetrator of the violence, which is cen-
tral to the understanding of any honor killing. When it comes to
evaluating an honor killing asylum claim, the courts should of
course continue to analyze the strength of the claim with respect to
the legal elements described earlier in this Note.180 But the courts
should also focus on (1) whose honor has supposedly been tainted,
(2) what action (real or perceived) was the cause of the perceived
dishonor, and (3) whether that action is seen as so dishonorable
within the applicant’s country of origin that murder is the accept-
able remedy for restoring the honor. Ultimately, the focus should
be on the nexus between the applicant’s allegedly dishonorable ac-
tions and the motivation of the potential murder; neither the sex
177 See Al-Ghorbani v. Holder, 585 F.3d 980, 983–84 (6th Cir. 2009) (granting with-
holding of removal to two brothers who feared becoming the victims of honor killings
if deported to Yemen).
178 See id. at 996–99.
179 Id. at 998.
180 See supra Part II.A.
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of the perpetrator nor that of the intended victim (the asylum ap-
plicant) should be relevant to this inquiry.
By framing honor killings the way it did, the Sixth Circuit rec-
ognized that while honor killings do stem from notions of family
honor, unwavering patriarchy, and the violent repression of wo-
men, the resulting atmosphere necessarily implicates the men who
either passively disregard or outright challenge this system by re-
specting the individual autonomy of women. These men, who have
entered into consensual relationships or taken part in consensual
acts with women (whether through marriage, premarital sex, dat-
ing, or simple hand-holding) even though society deems the wo-
men unfit to make such personal decisions, have effectively taken a
stand against the pervasive and long-standing tradition of re-
pressing women. These men deserve the same level of protection
and the same respect by our courts as the women who fear becom-
ing the victims of honor killings.
By announcing that he did not share the sexual orientation of
the majority, the sexual orientation of the so-called pure and the
respectable, Ahmet Yildiz had brought grave shame and dishonor
upon his family.181 His life was at risk as he began receiving death
threats.182 However, if he had brought an asylum claim in the
United States, there would be no guarantee that the court would
find that Yildiz could even be legitimately fearful of becoming the
victim of an honor killing.
Perhaps the case of Ahmet Yildiz seems more straightforward
because the persecution he feared was based partly on his sexual
orientation. But the death threats made against him by his own
family members were still made in reaction to shame, dishonor,
and wounded pride. The atmosphere of homophobia that allowed
for these death threats to be made, and ultimately acted upon, was
not restricted within Turkey to the Yildiz family. Like the desire to
control the lives of women, the demand for heterosexuality and
disgust with homosexuality are deeply rooted in culture and can
take generations to overcome. Instead of the sex of the potential
victim, courts should examine the societal and cultural concept of
honor in the applicant’s country of origin and the ways in which it
can be so damaged that it can only be restored through murder.
As the former UN Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women
has stated, honor killings “may not be exclusively committed
against females, but they are almost exclusively committed to main-
181 See Birch, supra note 1.
182 See id.
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tain a rigid, heterosexual, patriarchal gender order that [enforces]
female subordination to and male compliance with the prevailing
norms.”183
B. The Responsibility of Federal Agencies
The responsibility to use a gender-neutral definition in order
to accurately describe honor killings should not be limited to the
courts hearing asylum claims. The U.S. State Department’s Coun-
try Reports on Human Rights are commonly entered into evidence
by both parties to an honor killing asylum claim.184 Yet the State
Department has been defining honor killings in gendered terms,
which, besides being inaccurate, has contributed to asylum courts’
inability to comfortably extend asylum protection to men who fear
becoming the victims of such violence.185 Asylum courts do view
these reports as authoritative; it was precisely because the State De-
partment had defined honor killings as a form of violence against
women that the Third and Seventh Circuits denied the asylum
claims of two male applicants.186 It is imperative that the State De-
partment choose its words carefully when describing honor killings
in these country reports. It should make every effort to accurately
describe this form of violence in a gender-neutral manner while
still emphasizing that the majority of honor killing victims are wo-
men, although men are also targeted. The State Department is in a
unique position to highlight that the murder of these men is no
less atrocious and that their fear is no less legitimate than that of
women.
Like the State Department, the United States Citizenship and
Immigration Services (USCIS) categorizes honor killings as a form
of violence often directed at women.187 In light of the inconsistent
circuit court decisions regarding the gendered application of asy-
183 Ghosh, supra note 29.
184 See supra Part II.B.ii.
185 See supra Part II.C.
186 See Jamil v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 327 F. App’x 336, 339 (3d Cir. 2009); Abdelghani
v. Holder, 309 F. App’x 19, 23 (7th Cir. 2009). These holdings are described in more
detail supra Part II.C.
187 See U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., ASYLUM OFFICER BASIC TRAINING COURSE:
FEMALE ASYLUM APPLICANTS AND GENDER-RELATED CLAIMS 10 (2009), available at http:/
/www.uscis.gov/USCIS/Humanitarian/Refugees%20&%20Asylum/Asylum/AOBTC
%20Lesson%20Plans/Female-Asylum-Applicants-Gender-Related-Claims-31aug10.pdf
(categorizing “honor killings” as one of the “[f]orms of harm that are unique to, or
more common to, women,” along with rape or sexual violence, infanticide, FGM,
forced abortion, forced marriage, bride burning, trafficking, slavery, and domestic
violence).
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lum for an honor killing claim, USCIS should consider releasing
guidelines for how asylum courts should view a form of persecution
that affects men and women at different rates. The first step would
be to verify that honor killings are indeed directed at men as well
as women. Denmark has already taken the first steps in clarifying
the gendered terminology used to describe honor killings.
Like the United States, Denmark may grant asylum based on
an honor killing claim if the court finds that the applicant meets
the general standard for asylum.188 When analyzing an honor kill-
ing asylum claim, the Danish asylum courts do not generally con-
sider the gender of the applicant to be a factor in the legitimacy of
the claim.189 Instead, the courts focus on “whether the narrative of
the applicant is coherent and reasonable and in conformity with
known [country of origin] information concerning the applicant’s
country og [sic] origin.”190 This determination is made after “the
conduction of a specific, individual assessment” of all the facts.191
In March 2009, the Danish Immigration Service (DIS) began
noticing that in addition to the honor killing asylum claims filed by
women from the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (“Kurdistan Region”),
Kurdish men were also beginning to file such claims in Den-
mark.192 Thus, DIS undertook a fact-finding mission to determine
the situation of male victims of honor killings in the Kurdistan Re-
gion.193 The findings revealed that the men who had brought dis-
honor upon their families or the families of the woman with whom
they were conducting an illicit relationship did fear for their
lives.194 It is unclear how the Danish asylum courts have incorpo-
188 See E-mail from Nils Bak, Press Officer, Danish Immigration Serv., to author
(May 30, 2012, 10:28 EST) (on file with author).
189 See E-mail from Hans Peitersen, Chief Advisor, Ctr. of Asylum and Family
Reunification of the Danish Immigration Serv., to author (May 31, 2012, 05:40 EST)
(on file with author) (“The Danish asylum practice recognizes that both men and
women may be the subjects of so-called honor-killings, and assessing claims from men
differ little or not at all from assessing claims from women.”).
190 Id.
191 E-mail from Nils Bak, Press Officer, Danish Immigration Serv., to author (May
30, 2012, 10:28 EST) (on file with author).
192 DANISH IMMIGRATION SERV., HONOUR CRIMES AGAINST MEN IN KURDISTAN REGION
OR IRAQ (KRI) AND THE AVAILABILITY OF PROTECTION 2 (2010) (Den.), available at
http://www.nyidanmark.dk/NR/rdonlyres/3E22AAC6-C28F-420B-9EDB-B8D2274D3
E2D/0/KRGrapportÆresdrabjan2010SLUTRAPPORT.pdf.
193 Id.
194 See id. at 3. The report further found that although honor crimes against men
do indeed occur in this region, all of the focus on honor crimes and the protection of
potential victims is directed exclusively towards women, making it very difficult for
potential male victims to find adequate assistance and protection. See id. at 9. This has
left many of these men in a position where they believed that their only source of
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rated these findings into their analysis of honor killing asylum
claims, but such an investigation is certainly a step in the right di-
rection that should be emulated by federal agencies in the United
States. An inquiry into the phenomenon of honor killings directed
at men would not only verify that male applicants could be legiti-
mately fearful of this persecution, but would provide powerful per-
suasive authority for the courts. Such authority is currently lacking,
and its absence is allowing—if not outright encouraging—judicial
decision makers to deny asylum to men who fear becoming the
victims of this horrific form of violence simply because they are
men.
CONCLUSION
Whether a man faces the threat of an honor killing because of
his sexual orientation or because of an illicit relationship with a
woman, the anticipated murder is still motivated by the dishonor
that the man’s action has brought upon another individual or fam-
ily. It cannot be that the fear of murder would be cognizable
before some courts and not before others solely based on the sex
of the asylum applicant. When the motivation behind a murder is
that “[b]lood cleanses honor,”195 ratios and percentages relating to
the sex of the victims simply should not matter. The purpose of
asylum will be better served if the courts hearing honor killing asy-
lum claims disregard the fact that the applicant is a member of the
minority of honor killing victims and instead analyze whether the
applicant has proven that he faces death because of the dishonor
that his actions are believed to have brought upon another individ-
ual or family. Honor killings are such an astonishing form of vio-
lence because of their motivation; it is this same motivation that
must be the focus of the courts.
protection existed outside Iraq, prompting them to flee their country and seek asylum
protection elsewhere. Id. at 14.
195 Ruane, supra note 19, at 1532.
